Reforming the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova
The policy brief is part of the project „Eastern Partnership Security Forum”, that aims to launch the “EaP Security Forum” that will engage nongovernmental and governmental experts from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine in a joint effort to strengthen security resilience of their countries in the areas of cybersecurity, intelligence reform, offsetting hybrid threats, and strengthening the national defense.
The project is funded by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and implemented by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with the Georgian Center for Strategy and Development and the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
Abstract
The purpose of the study was to summarize the legislative and institutional efforts on reforming the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova. This study followed the 2013 Parliament’s Strategy of reform and focused on the 2014 Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, with the subsequent Associations Agendas, and results of its implementation.
Out of the three basic objectives of the 2013 Strategy, the independence of the Security and Intelligence Service creates the most confusion, and the other two – institutional capacities and accountability, although targeting two important issues, have several flaws in their more specific objectives and goals.
The Association Agreement set the most clear strategic objectives for the reform process, and the Association Agendas/included other significant objectives for a firm reforming, which, however, were not accomplished.
The reform of the intelligence service in Moldova has not begun yet, despite being discussed and promoted for 7 years. The new democratically elected Parliament, with an unprecedented pro-European majority, must restart the reform process of a pillar that is important for the national and regional stability and security, as well as establish a new National Intelligence Service.
Keywords
intelligence, reform, Moldova
Introduction
The activity of the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova remains in the permanent attention of the society and is reprimands. Illegal surveillance, blackmails, political bias – the periodicity of public accusations does not slow down. The situation is aggravated by the extreme secrecy of the activity. The society does not understand what the objectives are and does not know what the methods of activity of the service are. The negative perception is well founded on an outdated legislative regulation.
Shy attempts at reformation have not been successful. Some good ideas did not come true, some harmful ones took root. This is because the beginnings were wrong. Effectively, the process of reforming the intelligence service must start from special law. The study analyses the policy documents adopted for reforming purpose. Starting from the parliament’s strategy, the focus is directed to the Association Agreement of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union.
The bibliography consists of legislative acts, international agreements, strategies and programs, relevant international studies on the role and responsibilities of intelligence services. The study does not cover all aspects of voluminous topic of reforming intelligence, only outlines some important objectives, corresponding to national security priorities and considering international recommendations and experience.
Objective of study is to provide a coherent answer to the question of what a modern intelligence service should look like. What concrete actions are to be taken in the next period. For this objective, we structured the study in the analysed documents, discussions, conclusions and proposals. Our methodology brings together documentation, observation and analysis.
Strategy of Reforming the Security and Intelligence Service
Adopted on 10 October 2013 by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova[1], the Strategy of reforming the Security and Intelligence Service became a document reflecting parliamentarian vision for that time. Further, on 27 June of 2014 will be signed Association Agreement by the Prime minister and ratified by Parliament on 2 July of 2014. Towards the implementation of the Agreement, Government will correspond association agendas. Still, the 2013 Strategy is important since of setting the situation and the government’s will for reform before the signing of the Association Agreement.
According to the article 28 from the 2013 Strategy, „KGB shadow” continuously hover the special service, mainly because of closed character of the activity and faulty relation with common public. Mention that, despite the commitment of the association and some efforts made, this perception has practically not changed until 2021[2]. Below we will see the causes of this fact, and that causes will help develop working recommendations for improvement.
Strategy of Reforming the Security and Intelligence Service sets three basic objectives: 1) ensuring the independence in activity of the Service; 2) streamlining institutional capacities in the main fields of activity; 3) achieving accountability of the Service in relation to the society and consolidation of democratic oversight on the Service. Of the three basic objectives, the independence arouses the most confusion, and the other two – institutional capacities and accountability, although focused correctly, have deficiencies in the specific objectives.
Principles
The Strategy argues objective for the independence of the Service by the need to protect it from political influences, business environment and civil society, as well conflicts of institutional interests and the corruption factor. Undoubtedly, an intelligence service must act in strict accordance with legal provisions and in accordance with public interest. It must not admit any abusive interference or corruption. At the same time, the Service cannot isolate itself from politics, business environment or civil society. However, inappropriate influences must be counteracted by criminal and preventive methods. The legality effort cannot be confused with institutional independence. Institutional independence cannot replace accountability. Regarding a modern intelligence service, which is more often seen as part of the executive branch, this is not the case with independence[3].
The efficiency of institutional capacities presents a good direction of development, but it must be directed correctly, first through the methods of professionalization, integrity and motivational leadership. Replacing them with interior reform measures or technical-material endowment will not build a transparent and effective service.
Accountability of the Service in relation to the society and consolidation of democratic oversight sounds the best of the three proposed basic objectives. But studying specific objectives disappoints expectations. The Strategy rightly states that the deficiency of the information system reduces the degree of confidence in the Service’s capabilities and creates difficulties in forming an efficient and useful dialogue for the process of ensuring national security. The premises are good, but, among the positive practices, only the publication of the draft normative acts and the partial opening of the files of the totalitarian regime are mentioned. The specific objectives contain some appropriate ones, such as expanding the dialogue and creating sustainable partnerships, but other essential ones are missing, such as strategic planning in line with society’s expectations as well is missing reporting of the activity, with some due restrictions. Planning and reporting would be the path to an efficient and inclusive service. Other states experience demonstrates great potential of openness and dialogue[4].
The Association Agreement set most clearer strategic objectives, and the Association Agendas for its implementation inserted decisive objectives for a firm reforming. Sadly, inserted but unrealized.
Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova
The Association Agreement[5] is a comprehensive document that aims to promote basically important political and economic integration. Among other things, attention is paid to the issues of stability, conflict prevention and crisis management, targeted by Title II; as well to the issues of freedom, security and justice, targeted by Title III. The Association Agreement establishes a solid foundation for the country’s development and through Association Agendas[6] will serve the multiple amendments and legislative creation.
Among the priorities of the agendas starting 2014, the reform of the Security and Intelligence Service persists, but it has not been carried out. On the contrary, in this period – 2014/2021, the activity of the Service was disturbed by the political battles manifested by re – subordinations from the President of the country to the Parliament and vice versa, plus the third attempt of subordination declared unconstitutional. Also, during this period, the director of the Service was changed four times and the important projects remained unrealized.
The specific fundamental objectives for the intelligence reform were two: the new Law on the National Intelligence Service and the Law on counterintelligence and external intelligence. The projects were elaborated, passed several endorsements and project approvals, but did not result in final approval in the Parliament. We consider that it is the biggest escape of the intelligence reform process. That laws could serve the development of the intelligence community in Moldova, but it was not.
New Laws
Why is important to elaborate and adopt those two new laws? First, existing law on Security and Intelligence Service lack advance the human security-based approach; shortcoming respect for human rights in the service activity; focuses on state security to the detriment of individual and community security; omits clear regulation of the institutional control of the service, through the judicial bodies, the Court of Accounts, the personal data protection authority; do not reach international cooperation. Even parliamentary control is poorly regulated, vague and inefficient[7]. Second, a modern intelligence service must be guided by principles of good security sector governance: accountability to representative authorities; transparency and oversights with protection of sensitive information; rule of law on an unambiguous framework; inclusive procedures; effectiveness for state and human security; efficiency using public resources. That principles may be reached by new laws.
The Report on the measures taken till 2017 on Association Agenda[8], finds that the promotion of laws on the National Intelligence Service and on counterintelligence and external intelligence is stopped, due to “differences of vision at the institutional level” and in accordance with Parliament’s Regulation stating that registered but not included in the agenda for more than 2 years projects become null and void. Following this sad finding, the efforts for reform of the intelligence service was practically abandoned.
The only important legislative changes regarding the Security and Intelligence Service, after the adoption of the Service Reform Strategy in 2013, were made in 2016, when the service was subordinated from the President to the Parliament and in 2019, when it again changes the subordination from the Parliament to the President. There were no other key legislative changes. The law has remained without essential changes since its adoption in 1999.
Objectives
Others specific objectives were established in the Association Agendas important for improving stability and security, but not directly related to reforming intelligence.
We must note that deplorable situation is not for the Service fault, at least not the middle or low-level managements. During the 2013 – 2016 years and the 2019 – 2021 years the Security and Intelligence Service taken some measures to ensure ground for developing reforming agenda, some openness and collaboration with civil society[9]. Was created a new web site, adapted to provide more information on Service’s activity; was elaborated and promoted new Strategy on Information Security; after realization of 2015 National cyber security programme, started work on new Cyber Security Strategy; created platform for civil society consultation on important issues; realised a few seminars and conferences with independent experts, Civil Society Organisations representatives, as well, academia and media representatives; some others important activities[10].
The period of 2017, 2018, and first half of 2019 was of visible closed Service from any form of collaboration with civil society or information delivering on service’s activity. That close period was obviously due to “captured state” situation and totally undue, abusive control of the Service from oligarchic structures. That is a shame period of the Service, when committed a crime toward 7 professors illegally extradited to the authoritarian regime of Turkey. Crime was constated by a judicial sentence when ex-director of Security and Intelligence Service was convicted for abuse and grave human rights violation[11]. The case is in appeal, as well society wait for more clarity and new convicted persons, undoubtedly participated on crime realisation.
That was not the only case of undue activity of some service’s officers: civic activists still discuss implication in illegal surveillance of politic opposition, civic activists and media representatives; denigration of political opponents of government; blackmails of important media representatives; and others. Statement of 2013 Strategy regarding “KGB shadow” remain valid.
Back to failed reforming agenda, agreed by the state Republic of Moldova, it was impossible to realise without political support of the Parliament and others supreme authorities, as President, Government or Supreme Security Council. Support was absent.
Parliament elections of July 11, 2021, deliver hope that reforming agenda will restart, and Parliament through specialized commission will reanimate draft laws on the National Intelligence Service and on counterintelligence and external intelligence.
Conclusions
Prior to the signing of the Association Agreement, the state authorities undertook a series of measures aimed to reform the intelligence service. These measures were not well-founded and did not set the right targets. Main deficiency is that the reform efforts started from the desire to repair the existent regulation but not from the desire to achieve goals of good security sector governance on a new basis. Attempts to good institutions reform based on the old foundation were doomed to failure. However, change was difficult, provided that the political will for real change did not exist either.
Unfortunate, the objectives set by the Association Agreement have not been achieved and at some stages have even been abandoned. We consider that this devolution is primarily due to the situation of the captured state, meaning oligarchic political will, aimed at achieving illegal incomes and personal vicious ambitions but not the modernisation of state institutions. Such approach could not deliver results.
As the Association Agreement has set out certain conditions to be achieved – including stability and security, methods and means of achievement can be adjusted more correctly. In addition, an important advantage was the attempt in the Association Agenda to fundamentally change the institution, establishing modern principles of activity.
At the same time, the realization of the intelligence reform could be guided by the common interests declared by the “Association Trio”, established between Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova on May 17, 2021. All the more so the Declaration by the Heads of State of Association Trio of July 19, 2021 from Batumi, states close work to increase resilience to better respond to the challenges to regional and European security, including on countering hybrid threats, strengthening cyber resilience, fighting disinformation, developing cooperation platforms with the EU’s relevant agencies and services[12].
Conclusions of the study:
- The reform of the intelligence service in Moldova has not even begun, despite 7 years promotion.
- The main omission in the reform of the Security and Intelligence Service is the adoption of new Law on National Intelligence Service and the Law on counterintelligence and external intelligence.
- The lack of transparency in the activity of the Intelligence Service creates premises for severe violations of human rights, political bias and committed grave crimes.
Democratically elected on July 11, 2021, Parliament, with an unprecedent pro-European majority must restart reforming of the important pilar for national and regional stability and security and establish a new National Intelligence Service.
Proposals
The new Law on the National Intelligence Service, being comprehensive and concise, guided by good security sector governance principles, must respond to the needs of valid information delivering to political power in order to help defining national interest threats; prevention and reaction to major security crises; harmoniously combine national, state and human security interests.
The Law on counterintelligence and external intelligence activities provide instruments to counter modern hybrid threats, including foreign espionage activity; sabotage or subversion, including economic influences; illegal foreign political influences; strong international cooperation.
The new regulations of two laws must envisage a single agency activity, not divided in many.
Important changes that can provide those two laws refers to enforcement of good governance principles in all aspects of state administration, exploiting the important role of the intelligence service in combating corruption. These measures are particularly important now, when corruption is officially declared a major threat to national security, and the fight against corruption is the zero priority of the new political power in Chisinau.
Proposals for Parliament:
- The new political government of the country must revive the process of reforming the Security and Intelligence Service. This can best be done on the platform of the Association Agreement with the European Union and the platform of Association Agendas, as well Association Trio on Establishing Enhanced Cooperation on European Integration – Georgia, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova.
- It is necessary to review the draft and adopt new Law on National Intelligence Service and the Law on counterintelligence and external intelligence.
- In order to overcome the extreme secrecy of the service, but also to improve the wrinkled image, it is necessary to publish and discuss the annual activity reports.
Bibliography
- Parliament decision Nr. HP230/2013 from 10.10.2013 regarding Strategy of Reforming the Security and Intelligence Service
- Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, February 2021, p.40,83
- DCAF SSR Backgrounder Intelligence Service, Roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance, 2017
- Lozancic D., Insights and lessons learned from Croatia’s intelligence reforms, DCAF, 2020
- Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, 30.08.2014
- Association Agenda between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 26.06.2014
- Law on Security and Intelligence Service, No. LP753/1999, web access: legis.md
- Progress Report on the Association Agenda, 2017
- Enicov V., Engagement between Civil society and Intelligence community in Moldova, DCAF, 2021
- Official SIS site, web access: sis.md/communicate
- General Prosecutor Office, press release, web access: procuratura.md/news, 9.09.2020
- Declaration by the Heads of State of Association Trio – Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, Batumi, 19.07.2021
[1] Parliament decision Nr. HP230/2013 from 10.10.2013 regarding Strategy of Reforming the Security and Intelligence Service
[2] Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, February 2021, p.40,83
[3] DCAF SSR Backgrounder Intelligence Service, Roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance, 2017
[4] Lozancic D., Insights and lessons learned from Croatia’s intelligence reforms, DCAF, 2020
[5] Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, 30.08.2014
[6] Association Agenda between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 26.06.2014
[7] Law on Security and Intelligence Service, No. LP753/1999, web access: legis.md
[8] Progress Report on the Association Agenda, 2017
[9] Enicov V., Engagement between Civil society and Intelligence community in Moldova, DCAF, 2021
[10] Official SIS site, web access: sis.md/communicate
[11] General Prosecutor Office, press release, web access: procuratura.md/news, 9.09.2020
[12] Declaration by the Heads of State of Association Trio – Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, Batumi, 19.07.2021
