Engagement between Civil Society and Intelligence Community in Moldova
This paper has been prepared by Vadim Enicov for the Civil Society Forum on Security Sector Governance and Oversight, organised by The Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) and DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, held on 19-21 October 2021. Discussed in the panel on Intelligence Reform: the role and contribution of civil society.
Abstract
Engagement between Civil society and Intelligence community in Moldova is an important prerequisite for the democratic development of the country. Over the last thirty years of Republic of Moldova’s independence the legal basis and extensive practices have been created for such engagement. The experience of interaction has known mutually beneficial successful times and deficient stagnation. In this study we aim to assess the existing positive models for the past five years, communication issues and their effects, as well as lessons learnt. Based on empirical analysis we formulated recommendations for mutually advantageous interaction.
Keywords
intelligence; civil society; public benefit;
Introduction
Moldova is on a pathway to a democratic and prosperous society. The country had made mistakes and had learnt lessons. The 2009 Twitter revolution, billions stolen in 2014, captured state by 2019, authoritarian and unlawful escapades, all have led to lessons that could be learned. The general perception of the society is that Intelligence has steadily provided important support in such events, although intelligence assistance to interest of certain groups to the detriment of public benefits had also occurred. Development of Intelligence community is too far from society and too close to political parties and their leaderships. Defying the Constitution, the role of Parliament in Intelligence governance is insignificant and ignorant. Decisions that should have been taken in sessions of the specialized commission or in plenary meetings, are taken in closed offices. Competent civil society entities want to establish an efficient dialogue to enhance professionalism and accountability of Intelligence community, but they have not yet succeeded to do it.
Undoubtedly, necessary decisions must be taken by the Parliament, but they must be debated and enforced. If we succeed in justifying mutual benefits of engagement between Intelligence community and Civil society, we promote willingness for a dialogue, with the impetus coming from both sides for a predictable, exhaustive, and clear regulation. This study attempts to look for such justification. The novelty of the study is that we address the issue from both perspectives, searching to connect the approaches of both sides. We want to reach openness, response, fairness supported by law.
Empirical data were collected from public information resources posted on websites of the Parliament, Security and Intelligence Service, Non-Governmental Organizations, other civil society actors, as related to the legal and regulatory framework. Multiple studies and expert reports in the field of intelligence and civil society used in this study show important areas of their activity. Relevant international experience was used to structure the study[1][2]. Analysis of relevant content allowed for evaluation of engagement in Moldova.
The study consists of two main parts: Analysis of empirical data, with evidence and collected data, findings and evaluation; Conclusions and recommendations. Based on an interdisciplinary approach, our research methodology comprised observation and documentation; logical analysis and synthesis; as well as comparative methods.
Assessment of engagement between Intelligence community and Civil society
Addressing engagement in Moldovan society
In recent years, Moldova’s security sector has gone through deep crises. Parliament’s statement of 8 June 2019[3]on the captive nature of the state proves this claim. The crisis is shown by low confidence of the people in Parliament and political parties. Moldovan society is extremely politicized and polarized. About two thirds of population believe that things are going wrong in the country[4] and political discourse invades the public space to the detriment of local, social, and economic issues. However, we believe that among many failures of Moldovan democracy, there is one incontestable achievement: periodical, elective change of political power. Partly, it is conditioned by extreme politicisation of society, which is noticeable within the Intelligence community when it is supporting selected politicians.
The intelligence community should be directly interested in decreasing society’s politicization and focusing on practical, professional issues of solving its problems. This would reduce job uncertainty of intelligence professionals, increase work quality and augment prestige of the profession. The Intelligence community must cooperate with Civil society in pursuing common interests.
The number of publications by Moldovan Civil Society Organisations in security and intelligence areas is not plentiful, while concerns with security issues in society are high. Nevertheless, organisations perform research and studies in the field of security on various aspects of public interest. The research emphasis is on general state of security, hybrid warfare, energy security, information security, development of civil society and others.
Of course, there is a substantial number of publications in security area by academic institutions and researchers, which play an important role in promoting the civilian view of the intelligence agenda, although they are not directly focused on engagement and interaction.
The media has an important role to play in promoting the security agenda and raising public awareness, along with opinion leaders of social networks. Various security aspects remain in the attention of the media, although they focus on “news of the day” without promoting a strategic agenda. A strategic agenda requires exchange of information, and developed common plans, which can be provided mainly through confidence-building[5].
Legitimacy and trust in Intelligence service can be measured. Moldovan society perceives the security sector as subordinated to political interests, often controlled by a single political party through undemocratic and authoritarian methods. People have the least trust in Parliament (83% of untrust[6]), which, among others, is associated with overseeing the work of Intelligence service. Mistrust of society also focuses on Intelligence community, with only a quarter (25%) of the population trusts. When viewed as part of executive power, Intelligence community is at the bottom spectrum of trust with less than 20% confidence. It should be noted that trust in non-governmental organisations is not too high either, with only 22% trusting them, although NGOs are not the entire Civil society, which includes the academia, the media, independent experts, etc. However, from 2004 to 2021 people’s confidence in Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) has increased from 16% to 25%[7]. Probably, that can be explained by general increase of confidence in law enforcement agencies, after previous post totalitarian decades of catastrophic failure.
Professionalism and integrity of Intelligence service is questioned by the society. Publications in mass media often refer to the subject. One of most outrageous cases is the one of Turkish professors. Seven persons were illegally extradited to an authoritarian regime by forces of Security and Intelligence Service with strong subversive political motivation. The issue stayed in public attention for three years and up to date. Former SIS director was convicted in this case[8], but general perception is that he is not the only one to blame and that political leadership was also at fault. In addition, Moldova was condemned by the European Court of Human Rights[9] in the case.
Another blatant case is that of unlawful surveillance over 2016 -2019 of more than 50 civic activists, politicians and media workers in the interest of an authoritarian political leader. While SIS was denying its involvement, prosecutors are investigating the case; the investigation is not over yet. The society’s perception is that surveillance was on behalf of an authoritarian politician, involved in several crimes in Moldova[10]. Justice is still to confirm these well-founded accusations. Only a critical, sincere approach to evaluation of intelligence activity can enhance its integrity.
Intelligence can provide a platform to deal with historic grievances. Soviet time damages, including mass deportation of the 40-ies and 50-ies, Transnistria conflict, role of secret services in those events remain important themes in Moldovan society. The activity of the Commission for secret archives is not very visible for the society. There is a wide area for joint investigations.
Regulation of engagement between Intelligence community and Civil society
The Law on Security and Intelligence Service[11] stipulates that the Service is a specialized authority for ensuring national security through intelligence and counter-intelligence measures, collection, processing, verification, and use of information. Additionally, the Service is obliged to provide information to citizens through the media or in other manner. We believe that specialized legislation provides sufficient leverage for good collaboration between intelligence community and civil society. However, legal provisions are not duly imbedded in real life and, therefore, need adjustment to establish clear commitments and responsibilities.
The legislation of the Republic of Moldova regulates in detail methods for ensuring state security[12] but relates only conceptually to national security[13]. For this reason, a substantial adjustment of the legal framework is needed with greater focus on public interest and protection of human rights. Intelligence community must act for the benefit of National security. To do this, public benefit must be integrated into institutional decisions.
Under this background, the role of civil society in achieving this goal is also important. The law on non-profit organizations[14] states that they operate for public benefit. To achieve the statutory purposes, they may carry out any activities except those prohibited by law. Also, public and local authorities must support public benefit activities.
Activities aimed at public benefit must be balanced with protection of national security. Specialized laws comprise restrictions on access to sensitive information. The law on state secret[15] provides a list of information that can be kept confidential and a list of types of information that cannot be kept secret. Knowledge of both issues must be constantly refreshed for both civil society and intelligence community, as sometimes they omit the consult the list of information that cannot be classified. Access to information of public interest is guaranteed by Law on access to information[16], which establishes principles of access to information and the obligations of entities to provide such information and stipulates exact conditions and terms. Unjustified refusal to disclose information can be appealed in court, which may order provision of denied information in adequate cases.
The above-listed laws also require revision and adjustment to modern understanding of access to public interest information. A good set of recommendations in this regard is the Tshwane Principles[17]. Although civil society organisations have been drafting and submitting proposals for adjusting legislation for more than five years, such adjustment was not done.
Interaction tools between Intelligence community and Civil society
We have carefully analysed the forms of dialogue used in Moldova over the period from 01 January 2017 to 30 June 2021. Empirical data were collected from public sources, mainly from the official SIS websites[18] and Civil Society Organisations websites.
Various forms of dialogue are used, the most popular being roundtables and meetings with the academia, 9 such events having been organised for each type of interaction over the studied period. Roundtable discussions with civil society representatives, local public authorities, national and international experts took place as follows: 1 in 2021; 2 in 2020; 1 in 2019; 0 in 2018 and 5 in 2017. Roundtables remain the most effective and open form of communication with civil society, although very few such events are organised. It is highly recommended to increase their number and to include a wider diversity of participants.
Of the nine meetings with the academia, specifically with teaching staff, students, and graduates: 2 were in 2021; 4 in 2020; 1 in 2019; 0 in 2018; 2 in 2017. Five of the meetings were carried out along with the National Institute for Intelligence and Security, which is a SIS subdivision, and only four were organised in cooperation with representatives of other universities. As civil society should be separated from the Intelligence community, effectiveness of communication with the academia which is a part of the Security and Intelligence Service, is relative. The framework of meetings must be expanded to include other universities.
Intelligence representatives participate quite actively in public events, although priority is given to measures with participation of veterans or academic circles close to Service. Of the total of 8 meetings, 2 were in 2021; 2 in 2020; 2 in 2019; 1 in 2018; 1 in 2017. While meetings serve to enhance openness and visibility of intelligence, preference must be given to events with debates, not only visiting memorials.
Various forms of information delivery were used quite actively – 6 in total: 1 in 2021; 3 in 2020; 1 in 2019; 0 in 2018 and 2 in 2017. Mostly, events comprised public lectures on some activity areas, like promotion of security culture among youth or anti-terrorist measures explained to population. Also, innovative forms of joint training with third parties were organised – 5 in total: 1 in 2021; 1 in 2020; 2 in 2019; 0 in 2018; 2 in 2017. Joint training events were targeted specifically to staff of air transport companies and focused on anti-terrorist exercises. Delivering information in any form is important, but it is not always easy to include dialogue in framework of events.
In the analysis we have covered 4 reports on review of various applications and requests for information as a form of interaction. These reports contain dozens of responses on cases. However, when we analyse interaction with civil society we refer to reports about these activities, but not responses to cases. No reports were issued for 2021; 2 in 2020; 0 in 2019; 1 in 2018; 1 in 2017. For this kind of engagement, it is important to increase the quality of delivered information, to exclude a purely formal approach and unjustified refusal.
In 2020, upon discussions with civil society, the decision was taken to establish a Coordination Council for Information Security. A draft decision was submitted to the Government in early 2020 but has not been approved yet. Also, in 2020 a new online platform, sis.md, was created aimed to conduct a form of dialogue with society, but its functionality is currently low. It is too early to analyse the effectiveness of such dialogue platforms, although the beginning is promising.
A serious concern is lack of annual activity reports by the Service. Activity reports could become one of the most effective interaction methods and a beginning of an open dialogue with civil society. It should be noted that, according to Article 20 of Law on Security and Intelligence Service[19], it is obliged to submit full activity reports to Parliament, President, and Government. However, such information cannot be found in open sources. The fastest and most effective way to remedy and open Intelligence community to Civil society is publication of annual activity reports. Regional experience shows such reports give a great impetus to public dialogue between Intelligence community and experts, or civil society groups[20]. A good start towards enhancing transparency is presentation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Report on implementation of the Information Security Strategy[21], developed by SIS in March 2020. It comprises quite relevant information about SIS activity in the chosen segment, while in the future this practice should be extended to the entire SIS area of activity.
Many expert reports from Civil Society Organisations deliver to public useful information on various aspects of national security and intelligence activity. We counted 17 expert reports in the studied period, from areas of social security to energy security and hybrid war. Expert reports serve as solid basis for informing society, experts’ community, and public authorities. It would be worthwhile to have the Intelligence opinions on such reports and to start discussions based on them, as the interest of Intelligence community to such reports is confirmed by the academia affiliated to Intelligence Institute, specialised publications, and overall knowledge on content of such reports. We would like to see development of a more extensive dialogue through engagement.
Distribution of interaction by years is eloquent. The lowest number of interactions with Civil society had occurred in 2018, with only 1 meeting during entire year with mentally disabled children and 1 information delivery on petitions. The closed period continued throughout the first half of 2019, with only one public event at the war veterans’ memorial. Over the period, the interest of civil society for the security sector has increased, with 5 expert reports in 2018 and 4 – in 2019. This was the final phase of the period declared by the parliament as that of a „captured state”, during which the director of the Service was changed twice. The most serious consequence of this closure, in addition to captured state with numerous long-term consequences, was the illegal extradition of 7 Turkish teachers. Other grave consequence of the closed period was illegal surveillance of politicians, opinion leaders, and important media. Thus, we conclude that one of the main consequences of the lack of engagement are serious human rights violations.
A revival has begun after the change of political power in Chisinau in June of 2019, with 11 interactions, including 4 expert reports. That showed precisely the links between Intelligence community and political power. The Moldovan society is keen to avoid repetition of that sad period.
During the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic year communication using technology has got a strong impetus, while the positive trend in this respect has started in the second half of 2019. Most meetings with Civil society, during the entire analysed period were in 2020 with 16 interactions, plus 4 expert reports by CSOs. The second successful year is 2021 with 7 interactions only in the first half of the year, plus 3 expert reports. The figures exceeded those of the pre-captured state period year of 2017, when interactions amounted to 14, with 1 expert report.
Connecting approaches
Intelligence Community highly appreciates its own openness and cooperation with Civil society[22]. In reality, there are many examples of good interaction such as roundtable discussions with civil society representatives; meetings with young scholars and students; debates with national and international experts on misinformation. A good example is the presentation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Report on Implementation of Information Security Strategy. A good start is the proposal to Government to establish a Coordinating Council for Information Security.
However, from a total of 45 interactions[23], 28 were with teaching staff of the National Institute for Intelligence and Security, a SIS subdivision; with graduates of the Institute; with veterans of the Service; or in form of communication with no dialogue. Only a few of the other 17 interactions, specifically 5, were with independent experts from strong Civil Society Organisations. Those 5 dialogue meetings took place over a 4.5-year period, or, approximately, 1 meeting per year. A greater number of such meetings could have been beneficial for confidence-building.
Society wants that Security and Intelligence Service should perceive its role not only as that of protecting country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, but also of protecting values and interests of society and human rights[24], this objective being stipulated in the SIS Reform Strategy[25].
Consequences of deficient communication are significant. Violation of human rights is among the first visible effects. Crimes are committed, that should be punished and are not. Authoritarian leaders are getting support which they are not entitled to, and these actions cannot be tolerated by society. Together, Civil society and Intelligence community, must rule out such shameful actions and find common ground for development, professional growth, and sustainable welfare.
People hope that after elections of 11 July 2021[26], the Parliament will play an important role in monitoring and supervision of the Intelligence community. In addition, competences and responsibilities shall be balanced in the security sector, including the coordinating role of the Security Council chaired by the President. To achieve all this, strong support is needed from Civil society. In this way, there is a good chance for democratic development.
Recommendations for strengthening engagement
Publishing annual activity Reports will strengthen the basis for a mutually advantageous dialogue.
Security and Intelligence Service’ website needs to be developed to become proactive in delivering clear information and open possibilities for addressing requests for information.
A greater number of meetings with independent experts would diversify interaction and strengthen engagement. Joint seminars of Intelligence Community and Civil Society Organisations in matters of public interest would deliver the much-needed dialogue and positive interaction.
Amending the Law on state security and the Strategy on national security with a shift in focus towards public interest and protection of human rights would be highly beneficial.
Amending the Law on state secret and the Law on access to information regarding establishing restrictive criteria for classification of information; and clear obligation on delivering requested information will make for better and more genuine communication between the civil society and the authorities, including the Intelligence Community.
References:
| 1 | DCAF, Rethinking Engagement Between Intelligence Services and Civil Society, Thematic Brief, 2021, https://dcaf.ch/sites/ |
| 2 | Fuior T., Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight, DCAF, 2021, https://www.dcaf.ch/ |
| 3 | Declaration on recognition of the captive nature of the state of the Republic of Moldova, by Parliament Decision No. 39 of 08.06.2019, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 4 | Public Opinion Barometer, February, 2021, Institute for Public Policy, pp. 92, https://ipp.md/ |
| 5 | DCAF Webinar, Civil Society and Confidence Building in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe: Best Practices and Outstanding Needs, Conference proceedings, 23-26 November 2020, https://www.dcaf.ch/ |
| 6 | General Prosecutor’s Office, Press release, Judgment of 15 July 2020 on former SIS Director, 16.09.2020, http://procuratura.md/ |
| 7 | European Court of Human Rights, Press release, Ozdil and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, ECHR 213 (2019), 11.06.2019, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ |
| 8 | RISE Moldova, Investigation, Ministry of interceptions, 14.06.2019, https://www.rise.md/ |
| 9 | Law on Security and Intelligence Service, No. 753 of 23.12.1999, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 10 | Law on state security, No. 618 of 31.10.1995, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 11 | National Security Strategy, Parlament Decision No. 153 of 15.07.2011, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 12 | Law on non-commercial organisations, No. 86 of 11.06.2020, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 13 | Law on state secret, No. 245 of 27.11.2008, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 14 | Law on access to information, No. 982 of 11.05.2000, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 15 | The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, Tshwane, South Africa, 2013, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/ |
| 16 | SIS official sites: https://sis.md/ro, and https://old.sis.md/ |
| 17 | Lozancic D., Insights and lessons learned from Croatia’s intelligence reforms, DCAF, 2020, https://www.dcaf.ch/ |
| 18 | Monitoring and evaluation report on implementation of the Information Security Strategy, for 2019-2024, Security and Intelligence Service, pp. 53, https://sis.md/ |
| 19 | Security and Intelligence Service Reform Strategy, by Parliament Decision No. 230 of 10.10.2013, https://www.legis.md/ |
| 20 | Radio Free Europe, Sandu’s pro-Europe party scores clear victory in snap Moldovan elections. 12.07.2021, https://www.rferl.org/ |
[1] DCAF, Rethinking Engagement Between Intelligence Services and Civil Society, Thematic Brief, 2021
[2] Fuior T., Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight, DCAF, 2021
[3] Decision of the Parliament, No. 39 of 08.06.2019, Declaration on recognition of the captive nature of the state of the Republic of Moldova
[4] Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, February 2021, p.7
[5] DCAF Webinar, Civil Society and Confidence Building in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe: Best Practices and Outstanding Needs, Conference proceedings, 23-26 November 2020
[6] Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, February 2021, pp.40,83
[7] Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, February 2021, disaggregated data
[8] General Prosecutor’s Office, Press release, Judgment of 15 July 2020 on former SIS Director, 16.09.2020
[9] European Court of Human Rights, Press release, Ozdil and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 11.06.2019
[10] RISE Moldova, Investigation, Ministry of interceptions, 14.06.2019
[11] Law on Security and Intelligence Service, No. 753 of 23.12.1999, www.legis.md
[12] Law on state security, No. 618 of 31.10.1995, www.legis.md
[13] National Security Strategy, Parliament Decision No. 153 of 15.07.2011, www.legis.md
[14] Law on non-commercial organisations. No. 86 of 11.06.2020. www.legis.md
[15] Law on state secret. No. 245 of 27.11.2008, www.legis.md
[16] Law on access to information. No. 982 of 11.05.2000, www.legis.md
[17] The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, Tshwane, South Africa, 2013
[18] SIS official sites: https://sis.md/ro, and https://old.sis.md/
[19] Law on Security and Intelligence Service, No. 753 of 23.12.1999, www.legis.md
[20] Lozancic D., Insights and lessons learned from Croatia’s intelligence reforms, DCAF, 2020, p.13
[21] Monitoring and Evaluation Report on Implementation of Information Security Strategy, SIS, 2020
[22] SIS reform Strategy, by Parliament Decision No. 230 of 10.10.2013. p.30, www.legis.md
[23] From websites sis.md and old.sis.md
[24] Monitoring and Evaluation Report on implementation of the Information Security Strategy. SIS. 2020
[25] SIS reform Strategy, by Parliament Decision No. 230 of 10.10.2013. p.30, www.legis.md
[26] Radio Free Europe. Sandu’s pro-Europe party scores clear victory in snap Moldovan elections, 12.07.2021
